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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUSTIN EARL CLAYBORN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 48695-2021
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR34-18-04108

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Justin E. Clayborn pled guilty to felony eluding with the persistent violator
sentencing enhancement, the district court sentenced him to ten years, with five fixed.
Mr. Clayborn filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the State agreed to resentencing due
to its failure to disclose evidence in the criminal case. At the resentencing hearing, the district
court imposed the same sentence. Mr. Clayborn appeals, and he argues the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December 2018, the State charged Mr. Clayborn with felony eluding a peace officer,
aggravated battery on law enforcement with a deadly weapon enhancement, misdemeanor
driving under the influence, and the persistent violator enhancement. (No. 47554 R.,1 pp.33–38;
see also No. 47554 R., pp.65–70 (amended information).) According to the presentence
investigation report (“PSI”), Sheriff Snarr tried to initiate a traffic stop after he saw Mr. Clayborn
speeding in his truck. (No. 47554 R., pp.90–91.) Mr. Clayborn fled at a high speed, and the
police chased after him, trying to get him to stop with spikes and pit maneuvers. (No. 47554
R., pp.91–92.) Eventually, Sheriff Snarr’s patrol car and Mr. Clayborn’s truck collided, and
Mr. Clayborn came to a stop. (No. 47554 PSI, pp.91–92.) This final collision formed the basis
for the aggravated battery charge. The State alleged that Mr. Clayborn intentionally hit Sheriff
Snarr’s patrol car “head on” with his truck. (No. 47554 R., p.67.)
In April 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Clayborn pled guilty to felony eluding
and the persistent violator enhancement. (No. 47554 R., pp.91–92 (court minutes).) The State
agreed to dismissal of the other charges, including aggravated battery. (No. 47554 R., p.91.)
In July 2019, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (No. 47554 Tr.,2 p.12 (p.20,
Ls.16–21).). The State recommended ten years, with five years fixed, and Mr. Clayborn
requested the district court retain jurisdiction or sentence him to ten years, with two years fixed.
(No. 47554 Tr., p.10 (p.15, Ls.18–20), p.12 (p.23, Ls.8–12).) Mr. Clayborn requested this
sentence so he would serve a similar amount of time as his recently imposed sentence of ten
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The Court augmented the record in this appeal with the clerk’s record and transcripts from
Mr. Clayborn’s prior appeal, No. 47554-2019. Citations to the prior appeal’s record or transcripts
will reference the case number: No. 47554.
2
There are two transcripts contained in one electronic document. Citations to this transcript
refers first to the overall page(s) of the electronic document and second, parenthetically, to the
specific pages of that transcript.
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years, with two years fixed, for burglary in another county. (No. 47554 Tr., p.12 (p.23, Ls.12–
15).) The district court agreed with the State and sentenced Mr. Clayborn to ten years, with five
years fixed, to be served concurrently to the burglary sentence. (No. 47554 R., pp.119–20 (court
minutes).) Mr. Clayborn did not appeal from the district court’s judgment of conviction.3 (See
No. 47554 R., pp.121–23 (judgment of conviction).)
In February 2021, the district court filed a copy of a judgment from Mr. Clayborn’s
post-conviction case. (R., p.11.) In the post-conviction case, the State and Mr. Clayborn
stipulated to resentencing because the State had failed to disclose certain evidence in discovery. 4
(Tr., p.6, L.19–p.7, L.2.) This evidence, an Idaho State Police (ISP) crash report, showed that
Sheriff Snarr actually ran his patrol car into Mr. Clayborn’s truck. (Tr., p.25, Ls.10–13.) The
post-conviction judgment granted Mr. Clayborn’s request for resentencing and vacated the
district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., p.11.)
Prior to resentencing, Mr. Clayborn submitted three exhibits in mitigation relating to the
final collision between Mr. Clayborn and Sheriff Snarr. (R., p.13.) First, Mr. Clayborn included
an affidavit from an accident reconstructionist that opined that, in the final collision, Sheriff
Snarr intentionally ran into Mr. Clayborn. (R., pp.17–21.) Second, Mr. Clayborn submitted this
expert’s curriculum vitae. (R., pp.22–28.) Third, Mr. Clayborn provided the ISP crash report,
which indicated that Sheriff Snarr drove into Mr. Clayborn. (R., pp.29–35.)
In February 2021, the district court held the resentencing hearing. (Tr., p.9, L.6–p.39,
L.16). Mr. Clayborn’s case manager testified in mitigation. (Tr., p.13, L.12–p.14, L.19.) The
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Later, Mr. Clayborn appealed from the district court’s restitution order, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. See State v. Clayborn, No. 47554-2019, 2020 WL 6606035 (Ct. App. Nov. 12,
2020) (unpublished).
4
At resentencing, the State explained that it failed to disclose the evidence because it “was
completely unaware of it.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.10–18.)
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State made the same sentencing recommendation of ten years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.15–16.) Mr. Clayborn requested ten years, with two years fixed, again, to run concurrently
with the sentence in the burglary case. (Tr., p.26, L.20–p.27, L.2, p.33, L.24–p.34, L.3.) The
district court imposed the same sentence: ten years, with five years fixed, to be served
concurrently. (Tr., p.38, Ls.13–16.)
Mr. Clayborn timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.38–39, 42–43.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with
five years fixed, upon Mr. Clayborn for felony eluding with the persistent violator enhancement?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Clayborn For Felony Eluding With The Persistent Violator
Enhancement
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Clayborn’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. §§ 18-112 (five-year maximum for felony offense); 19-2514 (five-year
minimum, life maximum for persistent violator); 49-1404(2) (felony eluding). Accordingly, to
show the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Clayborn “must show that the sentence, in
light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
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“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
In this case, Mr. Clayborn asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of the mitigating
factors, including his acceptance of responsibility, family support, good behavior while in
custody, and corrected understanding of the underlying facts of his criminal conduct.
First, Mr. Clayborn has accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his actions.
Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation. State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In 2018, Mr. Clayborn relapsed on methamphetamine after
six years of sobriety. (No. 47554 PSI, pp.4–5, p.22.) He was also drinking alcohol. (No. 47554
PSI, p.22.) He committed the burglary offense soon after and then the instant eluding offense
while awaiting sentencing for burglary. (No. 47554 PSI, pp.4–5, 18–19.) He recognized,
“[W]hen I do use, it’s an addiction for me that’s terrible.” (No. 47554 PSI, p.22.) At the first
sentencing hearing, Mr. Clayborn stated:
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I just want to apologize to the sheriff’s department, everyone involved in
this. I am a person that had everything, and I did that. I had everything. I decided
to take a drink that day.
There’s no doubt I’ll pay for it. I created more than just the sheriff’s
department, I created victims too. I created my
and my
wife are both victims now too [sic].
I could do better than this. I do got a bad record. I wish for another chance
on this one because this was the stupidest thing I’ve ever done by far.
(No. 47554 Tr., pp.12–13 (p.23, L.25–p.24, L.12.).) These statements of remorse, regret, and
acceptance of responsibility support a more lenient sentence.
Second, Mr. Clayborn’s wife was supportive. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family
support and good character as mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App.
2010) (district court considered family and friend support as mitigating circumstance).
Mr. Clayborn had been living with his wife and

at the time of the

offenses. (No. 47554 PSI, p.19.) He explained, “[M]y best support is my wife, she helps with
everything,” and, “[My daughter] is my life. I’m happy to come home every[ ]day.” (No. 47554
PSI, p.19.) Mr. Clayborn’s family support also warrants a lesser sentence.
Third, Mr. Clayborn’s good conduct while in custody justifies a shorter sentence. To this
end, Mr. Clayborn’s case manager testified: “He’s had no DORs, he’s had no infractions. And
he, like, has had one very, very minor corrective action. And that’s about it. There’s nothing.
He’s had lots of positive C notes.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.10–13.) Mr. Clayborn had positive notes for
volunteering and his job at the facility. (Tr., p.14, Ls.15–17.) Similarly, Mr. Clayborn stated at
the resentencing hearing: “I just want to say that I’ve been doing everything I could in prison to
better myself. I’ve been now going on three years. I try to stay positive in a negative time. And
so far it’s been working. I just hope this Court takes it into consideration.” (Tr., p.34, Ls.9–14.)
Mr. Clayborn’s conduct while in custody, which the district court described as “excellent,”
stands in favor of mitigation. (Tr., p.26, Ls.23–25.)

6

Finally, Mr. Clayborn notes that, while his eluding conduct did create a serious risk to the
public and law enforcement, and cause property damage, his conduct was not as threatening as
originally described by the State. The State initially charged Mr. Clayborn with aggravated
battery for intentionally driving into Sheriff Snarr’s patrol car, but that was not what happened,
as determined by the ISP crash report and Mr. Clayborn’s expert. (No. 47554 R., p.67
(aggravated battery charge); R., pp.21, 35 (accident reconstructionist opinion and ISP crash
report narrative).) Mr. Clayborn possibly would not have been charged with aggravated battery,
or that charge would have been dismissed, if the ISP crash report was available in the initial
criminal case. Although the State explained that Sheriff Snarr was justified in running into
Mr. Clayborn to stop his truck, (Tr., p.25, Ls.10–14), Mr. Clayborn still submits that these newly
discovered facts of the final collision are less severe than originally represented by the State. The
district court should have considered these facts in mitigation.
In sum, Mr. Clayborn maintains the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. He contends proper consideration of the
mitigating factors in his case supported a more lenient sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Clayborn respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
In the alternative, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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